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Abstract
What does it mean for an actor to empathize with the character she is playing? We review different theories of empathy and
of acting. We then consider the notion of “twofoldness” (Wollheim), which has been used to characterize the observer or
audience perspective on the relation between actor and character (Smith). This same kind of twofoldness or double attunement applies from the perspective of the actor herself who must, at certain points of preparation, distinguish between the
character portrayed and her own portrayal effected in her craft. We argue that this concept helps us to understand how the
actor can empathize with her character. For the actor who must study and rehearse her character, empathy may begin with
higher-order (narrative or imaginative) processes that provide a contextualized understanding of the character. This understanding eventually integrates with more basic empathic processes in her actual performance.
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“An actor’s job is empathy.” (Natalie Portman)1
“[T]o play truly means to be right, logical, coherent, to
think, strive, feel, and act in unison with your role....
and thus assimilate a psychological technique of living
a part” (Stanislavski 1936, p. 15, 16).
In this paper we address the following question: what
does it mean for an actor to empathize with the character
she is playing? The answer lies somewhere at the intersection between theories of empathy, of which there are many,
and a variety of acting practices, of which there are many.
This is a complex landscape. Our first task is to map this
landscape (Sects. 1, 2, 3) and then to define our position on
that map (Sect. 4).
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1 Setting the Stage: Debates About
Empathy
The psychologist Edward Titchener (1909) translated the
German term Einfühlung by the new English term ‘empathy’
just around the time there was a lively debate in Germany
about Einfühlung. Theodor Lipps (1906, 1909), a major figure in this debate, employed the term to refer to both our
experience of aesthetic objects and our sense of other minds.
Whereas Lipps thought of empathy as an everyday occurrence involving an automatic embodied resonance, Wilhelm
Dilthey conceived of it as a methodological tool to be used
for historical analysis and more generally as a method for the
human and social sciences (see Stueber 2006, pp. 11–12).
Dilthey (1992) contended that empathy involved a “transposing” [Hineinversetzen] process, where one puts oneself into
the position of the other person. We want to immediately
note the direct relevance of these considerations to acting:
that there is an aesthetic object in the form of a character to
portray; that empathy might count not only as something that
happens, but as a method; and that it involves putting oneself into the other’s perspective or situation. To make these
relevant points clear, and to set the stage for our discussion,
we think it is important to set out some of the details of the
debate about empathy.
According to Moritz Geiger (1910), who provided a
succinct summary of the early twentieth-century debate,
1

Quoted at http://entertainment.inquirer.net/68811/an-actors-job-isempathy.
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some theorists considered empathy to be a form of imagination, while others thought of it as a real instantiation of
another person’s emotion. Lipps embraced the latter view.
He claimed that we experience (not just imagine) the same
thing the other person experiences. Thus, if we experience
the anger of the other person, “this anger is not something
that is simply objectively there facing us, but we are in it.
We live in this anger, it fully gives itself, although for other
reasons it does not have the same effectiveness as anger in
daily life” (Geiger 1910, pp. 22; trans. revised).2 How we
do this involves a form of projection in which we add something of ourselves to our experience of the other’s external
signs (gestures, facial expressions, etc.): “we add something
mental from our own inwardness—here we have a special
act of the spontaneity of a mental nature, and not a simple
intake of the data transmitted to us from the outside” (Geiger
1910, p. 24, trans. revised; see; Lipps 1905, p. 17). Projection involves an elicitation of our own experience to fill in
what we cannot access of the other’s experience.
Although Dilthey thought of empathy in similar terms of
transposition and projection, he distinguished between “elementary understanding” and higher forms of understanding,
both of which involve empathy. Elementary understanding
arises in the context of practical life and our communicative
practices. It involves the interpretation of basic expressive
behaviors or activities (“such as picking up an object, letting
a hammer drop, cutting wood with a saw”), which in turn
add up to complex actions. To understand such actions one
relies on one’s own experience and the “projection of the self
into some given expression” (Dilthey 1976, p. 226).
The higher form of empathy is based on this elementary transposition (Dilthey 2002, p. 235), but with added
concerns about context or the connectedness of experience,
which “requires that the understanding go forward with the
line of the events themselves. It must advance continually
with the course of life itself. The process of transposing oneself or transposition expands to make re-experiencing a creation along the line of the events” (Dilthey 2002, p. 235). This
fuller or higher sense of empathy, he contends, is facilitated
by artistic expression in poetry or theater, or by fictional or
historical narrative. It involves a process of an imaginative
re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung) of a particular situation which “stimulates a re-experiencing in us” (ibid, 236).
Specifically, by transposing oneself into the other’s circumstances one can re-live the other’s feelings. “Thus human
beings who are determined from within can experience
many other kinds of existence through their imagination.
Confined by circumstances, they can nevertheless glimpse

exotic beauties of the world and regions of life beyond their
reach” (ibid, 327). This advanced form of empathy requires
that we make judgments about the other person’s character
and capacities. Context and circumstances matter in order
to gain insight.
A number of phenomenologists (Edmund Husserl, Edith
Stein, and Max Scheler, for example) joined the debate by
offering a perceptual account of elementary empathy. In contrast to Lipps, for whom we come to experience the same
emotion that the other experiences, according to Husserl,
when we grasp that another person is angry, we do not necessarily feel anger ourselves; if we see that someone else is
fearful, we do not empathize by experiencing fear ourselves
(Husserl 1973, p. 188). Zahavi (2014, p. 113) clarifies this
objection: “How plausible is it to claim that I have to be
scared myself in order to understand that my child is scared,
or that I need to become furious myself if I am to recognize
the fury in the face of my assailant.”
The phenomenologists see a second problem with Lipps’
position. It’s not clear that we project (or why we are warranted to project) our own experience onto the other. At best,
according to Stein (2012), this kind of projection would
explain a form of automatic mimicry/contagion, which falls
short of empathy. More positively, according to the phenomenologists, empathy involves becoming perceptually
aware of the other’s intentions and affective states. For both
Husserl and Stein empathy is a unique form of perceptual
intentionality directed at the other as an embodied subject.
In empathic perception we perceive the other’s body not as
an objective entity (Körper), as a scientist might perceive it,
but as an experiencing or lived body (Leib), a body that is
expressive of the other’s subjectivity. I get to this sense of
the other’s body through the ambiguous experience of my
own body as both lived and objective.3 Rather than a case
of attributing, imagining, projecting, inferring, or cognizing the mental states of others, empathy involves a complex
perceiving or apperception of the other’s intentions and
feelings that are perceptually present in her gestures and
expressions (Stein 2012, p. 3; Husserl 1952, p. 235). The
phenomenological notion of pairing (Paarung) (Husserl
1964), on which empathy is based, is a perceiving of the
other’s embodied behavior in terms of a set of pragmatic and
expressive capabilities that are also possibilities for my own
embodied existence. Accordingly I see her bodily behaviors
as intentions or feelings; in other words, I don’t perceive her
in isolation but rather as directed at our shared world.

3
2
Similar claims can be found in eighteenth-century French authors
such as Bernard Lamy (1699) and Jean-Baptiste Du Bos (1748). See
Foster (2005).
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Zahavi (2001, p. 161) explains that, according to Husserl, it “is
exactly the unique subject–object status of [my own] body, the
remarkable interplay between ipseity and alterity characterizing
body-awareness that provides me with the means of recognizing other
embodied subjects [as lived bodies]”.
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If we fast-forward 100 years we find a renewed debate on
the concept of empathy underway at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. This debate repeats many of the terms
of the earlier one, including a distinction between elementary and higher-order empathy, and contrasting views similar to those defended by Lipps and the phenomenologists
concerning elementary empathy, although now in the light
of recent advances in the neurosciences. Indeed, the more
recent debate has been motivated in part by the neuroscience of mirror neurons (MNs), the activation of which has
been interpreted as a form of simulation in philosophical
and psychological accounts of social cognition. Simulation
is a complex concept, but on one view simulation involves
imaginatively placing ourselves in the shoes of the other
person and asking what we would do in her situation. This
kind of simulation is considered a form of empathy, where
“the term ‘empathize’ [is] roughly equivalent to ‘simulate’
(in an inter-subjective fashion)” (Goldman 2006, p. 17, 205,
291; 2011, p. 34).
Goldman (2006) and Stueber (2006), along with neuroscientists like Gallese (2001), argue that a very basic kind of
automatic empathic simulation, which Gallese calls embodied simulation, is linked to the activity of the MN system.
In this respect, simulation theory draws on Lipp’s account
of empathy as an automatic imitation or resonance which
allows us to experience (not just imagine) the same thing
that the other person experiences. MNs are activated when
an agent engages in intentional action, and also when the
agent observes another agent engaging in intentional action.
Accordingly, MNs are said to simulate or match the other’s
actions, intentions and/or feelings by activating the same
mechanisms responsible for one’s own action and first-person agentive-experience. On this view, the automatic simulation or matching just is a basic form of empathy.
Again, as in the earlier debate, phenomenologists take
issue with the claim that empathy reduces to an automatic
activation of the motor system, something that seems closer
to contagion than to empathy (Zahavi 2012). Or again, it is
not necessary to match or replicate anger in my system, for
example, in order to grasp the fact that the other person is
angry (Zahavi 2014). I can never fully inhabit the other’s
feeling from a first-person perspective. But I can attune
to others’ intentions and emotions on the basis of what I
perceive of their behaviors and bodily expressions (Moran
2017), which, at least in part, constitute their intentions and
emotions. To the extent that I understand their intentions
and emotions in this way, that just is what phenomenologists
call empathy.

2 Spotlighting Imagination and Narrative
In this and the following sections we set out a contrast
between a simulation theory of empathy and an enactive
theory of empathy, and we present arguments in favor of
the latter. In the debates rehearsed above the focus was on
the question: to what extent does empathy require (or not
require) that one enters into the other’s perspective or situation in processes that involve automatic resonance or simulation, imagination, projection, or simply perception? To
get us closer to the question of the actor’s empathy for her
character, however, we want to return to Dilthey’s distinction
between elementary versus higher-order empathic understanding, and the idea that we may be able to use empathy
as a method. Dilthey’s distinction is mirrored in the contemporary distinction between basic and higher-order simulation
(Goldman 2006; Stueber 2006). Basic empathy, associated
with MN activation, as Stueber suggests, is not sufficient to
“explain and predict a person’s behavior in complex social
situations” or to provide “a full grasp of all mental concepts that we attribute to the typical adult” (2006, p. 147).
We require something more for these abilities, namely, a
higher-order empathy. According to a number of simulation theorists, this more sophisticated form of understanding requires the use of imagination and an understanding of
the other’s contextualized situation (Goldman 2006; Stueber
2006). On a simulationist view, for example, the empathic
state involves an “as if” or vicarious affective state, generated by the empathizer’s imaginative portrayal of another
person’s affective state. This capacity for creating vicarious
experiences is based on a specific kind of imagination (call
this S-imagination),4 which involves the running of off-line,
high-level (i.e., explicit, conscious) simulations of the other
person’s mental states (Vignemont and Jacob 2012, 2011).
There are several problems with the simulationist account
(see Gallagher 2007, 2008, 2012). We’ll mention just two
here: the starting problem and the diversity problem. The
starting problem concerns how one can initiate this sort
of S-imagination. This problem is apparent in Goldman’s
description of the first step. “First, the attributor creates in
herself pretend states intended to match those of the target
[the other person]. In other words, the attributor attempts to
put herself in the target’s ‘mental shoes’” (Goldman 2005,
pp. 80–81). This first step already seems to assume that we
understand the other person, i.e., that we know what mental
states to imagine. Yet that is what simulation is meant to
explain. How do I know what belief or desire matches the

4

Goldman (2006) calls this type of imagination ‘enactive’ or
E-imagination. To avoid some confusion with relevant enactivist
approaches to empathy (discussed below) we’ll call this type of imagination S-imagination (for simulative imagination).
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other person’s mental state? If I already know what state
matches the target, then the problem of understanding or
empathizing with others, as defined by simulation theory,
would already be solved. The diversity problem is related
to an objection raised by Ryle (1949) and a number of phenomenologists, namely that if we limit ourselves to our own
first-person experience, or to what we can imagine based on
our own experiences, and project that onto the other person,
it’s not clear that we are able to escape our own narrow perspective or genuinely grasp the other’s mental states, which
may be quite different from our own. S-imagination is based
on my first-person experience where I ask what I would do in
that situation (Gazzola and Keysers 2008). It’s not clear that
knowing what I would do gives me insight into what anyone
else might do. There is a large diversity of experiences that
others can have; but S-imagination seems designed simply
to project our own experience onto the other.
A contrasting, non-simulationist theory of higher-order
empathy, and one that we prefer, argues that I can start to
imagine the other person’s situation (rather than her mental
state), and thereby start to empathize with her, by drawing
on a rich store of narratives derived from both personal and
cultural sources (Gallagher 2012; Gallagher and Hutto 2008;
Hutto 2007). On this narrative-practice view, our reliance on
narrative reduces the need for simulationist style imagination. Since empathy is other-directed in a strong sense, it is
not sufficient for empathy to simply view the other through
the lens of my own experience. Rather, through narrative
practices I gain an openness to understanding another’s life
story, and to understanding his experience in his context.
This kind of N[arrative]-imagination, by drawing from a
diversity of narratives that have informed my understanding and enriched my imagination, does not depend on simulation, conceived of as relying only on my own narrow
experience. In contrast to Stueber (2008), who suggests that
narrative simply provides “hints and clues” to enhance the
simulation (empathetic reenactment) process, the narrative
view is that we rely heavily on narrative resources, which
open up the process to the more diverse circumstances that
may characterize the other. Narrative resources can include
our own self-narratives, but importantly includes the diverse
narratives of others and more general cultural narratives
(novels, plays, films, etc.) with which we are familiarized
starting at a very young age.
N-imagination also starts at a very young age. We appeal
here not only to accounts of the development of narrative competency in early childhood, but also to accounts
of imagination as an enactive practice (Rucinska 2014).5
5
“Children’s first narrative productions occur in action, in episodes
of symbolic play by groups of peers, accompanied by—rather than
solely though—language. Play is an important developmental source
of narrative” (Nelson 2003, p. 28). As Richner and Nicolopoulou
(2001, p. 408) put it, there are “two aspects of children’s narrative
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For example, Ryle’s account of imagination suggests that
imagination starts in childhood, not as a set of psychical
processes in the head, but as a form of pretending or playacting. Ryle’s example is the child pretending to be a bear.
In this case the child “roars, he pads around the floor, he
gnashes his teeth, and he pretends to sleep in what he pretends is a cave” (1949, p. 243). That is, the child does not
first draw up some image in his head, and then proceed to
playact it out; rather, as Ryle suggests, the imagining is in
the performance of playacting. This kind of playacting is a
case of (en)acting oneself as another, and it follows a narrative structure.6
This non-simulationist account of narrative practices is
part of an enactive theory of higher-order empathy. Empathy of this sort depends on the exercise of N-imagination,
which in some cases can be embodied in one’s actions, as
in the case of the child’s pretend play. The enactive account
of empathy also includes an alternative interpretation of the
role of MN activation in basic empathy. The enactive theory
follows the phenomenological idea that basic empathy is
perceptual, and specifically that it involves an action-oriented or enactive perception. I perceive the world in terms
of how I can engage with it; and I perceive others in terms
of how I can interact with them, even if I am not intending
to interact with them. Within this perceptual process MNs
are activated not for a simulative matching of the other’s
just past action that I have just perceived, but as an enactive preparation for responding to the other. Basic empathy
involves this other-oriented response. Responding to the
other includes the possibility of imitating them, but, as we’ll
see below, it also includes the possibility of acting oneself
as another, which is not reducible to imitation.
Dilthey’s suggestion that we can use empathy as a method
for gaining an understanding of others seems to apply to
higher-order empathy rather than to processes of basic
empathy. We note, however, that these two forms of empathy may be causally and reciprocally related. It is intuitive to
think, as Dilthey did, that higher-order empathy may depend
in some way on basic empathy, so that a purely intellectual understanding of a person’s context may not elicit a
higher-order empathy unless some form of basic empathy
is activated. It is also the case, however, that understanding
the other’s context or story can modulate or even generate
more basic resonance processes, as sometimes happens in
Footnote 5 (continued)
activity which are too often treated in mutual isolation: the discursive
exposition of narratives in storytelling and their enactments in pretend play.”
6
One finds a similar idea in body-psychotherapy where patients are
asked to act out their stories. For more on the relation between imagination, narrative, and pretend play, see Gallagher 2017; Gallagher and
Hutto 2019.
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Fig. 1  An enactive model of empathy

reading a novel or viewing a film. Empirical studies show,
for example, differential mirror-system responses to the (fictional) punishment of someone who the subject knows has
either cheated or played fairly at a game show—specifically,
no or less response to the punishment of the cheater (Singer
et al. 2006). Other studies show that we are more inclined
to act on our empathic feelings, and act altruistically, when
we know the other person’s personal narrative in contrast
to knowing impersonal information about a general situation (Slovic 2007). Specific types of social knowledge, or
knowing the context or the other’s story, then, may have an
effect on basic empathic processes, making them less than
automatic. Such reciprocal causal relations suggest that basic
empathy and higher-order empathy are integrated processes
and are thus not always clearly distinguishable. We can represent this relation in the following (Fig. 1).
The distinction between higher-order, N-imaginationbased empathy and basic empathy is similar to what Kurt
Goldstein called categorical or abstract versus concrete
attitudes. In this respect, we should think of the relation
between basic empathic processes and higher-order empathy more in terms of a gestalt relation as Goldstein suggests.
[The concrete attitude] is embedded in and codetermined by the abstract attitude. For instance, in the normal person both attitudes are always present in a definite figure-ground relation. (Goldstein and Scheerer
1964, p. 8)

3 Acting and Acting Method
It is the crudest form of empathy when the actor simply asks: what should I be like if this or that were to
happen to me? (Brecht 1975a, p. 195).
Our question is whether an actor can or does empathize
with the character that she plays. If so, precisely what form
does this empathy take? One possibility is that over the
course of studying a role, an actor moves through different
stages that involve both (or some integrated process of) basic
empathy and higher-order empathy. Indeed, one might think
that this is the ordinary course of events more generally in

contexts that involve empathizing with others. That is, we
may start in an initial encounter with either a basic form
of empathy transitioning into a higher-order form as one
comes to know the other’s (or the character’s) story and circumstances, or vice versa. One challenge for this view with
respect to acting is that, in most circumstances, the character
to be (en)acted (especially if the character is fictional) is
not physically present. One might start with a script that
describes the character, or, in the case of a character who
is a historical figure, reading material or a documentary
film. These are different situations, but in either case there
is no other person present in-person or face-to-face. Do such
situations elicit anything like an immediate form of basic
empathy?
In the case of starting with a script, we are not perceiving another person, or seeing someone engaged in intentional actions. This eliminates the phenomenological idea
of a direct perception of the other’s experience in their gestures, facial expressions, etc. But there is some evidence
that reading about actions activates our motor system, and
that, in so doing, reading generates a type of simulation or
resonance (Hauk et al. 2004; Tettamanti et al. 2005). The
silent reading of action words (e.g., lick, pick, kick) leads to
activation of different areas of the premotor or motor areas
involved in the control of mouth, hand, or foot, respectively.
This may suggest a very basic motor resonance of the sort
that Lipps describes in terms of proprioceptive-kinaesthetic
activations/experiences. Even if the mirror neuron system is
activated by reading specific words (as Gallese [2008] tentatively suggests), however, this seems a poor cousin to basic
empathy for the person we read about, even if the text or
script is action packed. Albeit specific for action components
(kicking vs. licking), it seems more like a typical arousal
response that happens for a variety of objects. The sight of
a hammer, for example, will activate canonical neurons in
the premotor cortex suggesting that we see things in terms
of the action possibilities they afford. If something similar
happens when we read a sentence such as ‘He picks up the
hammer’, it is not clear that this is empathy for the character,
rather than the arousal of an instrumental attitude in relation
to the hammer.
We know, however, that reading a text or watching a film
can elicit more specific intersubjective responses—various emotions, empathy, and sympathy. “Film experience is
embodied: the brain and the body—even viscera and the
skin—constantly resonate in accordance with the film’s
flow, with changes in muscular tension, perspiration, stomach state, etc.” (Grodal and Kramer 2010; see; Raz et al.
2012). This may be “guided by the narrative and aesthetic
orchestration of a film” (Grodal and Kramer 2010, p. 28).
That MN activations, or processes involved in direct intersubjective perception, are possible when watching films has
been suggested by Gallese and his research group in Berlin.
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On this view, we can empathize with a character in a film
by simulating her actions and emotions. This is evidenced
by physiological changes such as galvanic skin response
(GSR), which indicates emotional arousal (see Kaltwasser
2018). Murray Smith (2017) picks up on this account and
on Gallese’s notion of embodied simulation, as a way to
explain a viewer’s empathy with a character. “Mimicry of
basic actions and emotions may scaffold the imagination,
including the empathic imagination, of more elaborate,
finely specified states of mind” (Smith 2017, p. 180). These
studies suggest that an actor, in reading a script or in viewing
a documentary film about the character, could get an initial
empathic feel for her character. This seemingly approaches
the immediate aspects of basic empathy, although this
empathic response may not be exactly the same, or as strong
as when one encounters someone in person.
The authors just cited interpret such resonance or MN
activation in terms of simulation, but, as suggested above,
we can also interpret these processes from an enactivist perspective. Two things should be kept in mind. First, basic
empathy seems more complicated than simply the matching or mimicking of what one sees. In reading a novel or
watching a film the context provided by the novel or film
matters. In this respect, reading and perceptual processes are
already primed by and integrated with complex imaginative
processes which can easily include an action-oriented stance
concerning what I would do or be prepared to do in response
to the character I was viewing or about whom I was reading.7
This is the enactive interpretation of such processes, which
acknowledges some action-oriented complexity. Second, the
discussion focuses on a reader or viewer as part of the audience. Whether the simulationist description applies to the
audience member or not (and this could include an actor
who is in the process of studying in order to understand the
character), it doesn’t apply to the actor who is engaged in
a performance. In the latter case, as Cook (2007, p. 591)
points out, an actor does not imitate a character: “actors
perform actions required of their characters—they do not
‘imitate’ this action, they perform it.”
If the processes just described involve basic empathy,
they also already seem to involve higher-order empathy and
the use of imagination and narrative. As indicated by Grodal
7
There is much more to be said about this than we can discuss here.
The idea that perception (and reading) and imagination are closely
intertwined is a theme that can be found in the phenomenologists
(e.g., Husserl 1980; Sartre 2004), in much of the cognitive science
literature just cited, which suggests that imagination activates early
sensory areas in the brain (see Kosslyn and Thompson 2003) and in
recent predictive processing models that contend that perception and
cognitive processes like reading are informed by priors (e.g., Price
and Devlin 2011). These different literatures, however, make dramatically different assumptions and it would take more room than we have
here to adjudicate among them (see Gallagher and Allen 2018).
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and Kramer (2010, p. 28), these processes are already guided
by the narrative of the film or novel. From the perspective
of professional practice, pursuing these narratives is part
of the preparatory work that the actor must do. Especially
at the beginning of the process, in many cases one needs to
engage in imaginative practices in order to non-judgmentally attune to the character. Here we distinguish between
an empathic understanding of the character, and an evaluative judgment about the character. An evaluative judgment
can rob an actor of empathy, creating too much distance
or separation between the actor and the character. Indeed,
there may be some evaluative components involved in the
perceptual processes of basic empathy,8 and one may require
some methodological exercises to overcome such effects.
Instead of making an evaluative judgment about the character, actors will sometimes use higher-order empathy as a
method, explicitly setting aside any evaluative judgments,
potentially to seek out and accept that this character is the
way she is because of specific circumstances. Here one possible aim would be to empathize with the character through
an understanding of those circumstances. In some cases this
may involve creating the character as one goes through a
systematic absorption of the material, explicitly aiming for
an empathic understanding in a process of integrating each
word/action of the character into one’s own performance
(Goldstein and Winner 2010). This would be one way to
use a higher-order empathy as a method in order to achieve
something like a basic empathy for the character.
This use of a higher-order form of empathy, then, may
involve an actor’s research about her character with the aim
of understanding the detailed contexts or circumstances of
a character’s life or story. In this way the actor may use her
N-imagination to enact a sense of the physical, mental, emotional feel of what a character would go through in a certain
situation. An actor doesn’t need to get physically beaten to
know what it physically, mentally, and emotionally feels like
to be in a physically abusive relationship, for example. This
type of process, however, is not reducible to the immediate
resonance of basic empathy—it requires a more mediated
use of N-imagination, drawing not only on one’s personal
experience, but also on more general narrative resources.
This correlates to an actor’s work of getting to know her
character.
As we noted, at the beginning of an acting process the
actor may be in a similar observational position as someone
in an audience (reading a narrative or seeing a film about
the character). The “work” of the actor in this case is to
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Studies that show that activation of early visual areas are not evaluative (or reward) neutral (Shuler and Bear 2006), or neutral with
respect to perceiving a character as belonging to an in-group versus
out-group (e.g., Xu et al. 2009).
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transition from an observer-audience stance to a position
of enacting the character, which is not just representing a
character as a painting might represent an idea, but a form of
living or performing her character. In some cases, this work
may be harder than in other cases. Consider, for example, a
view (albeit a simulationist view) of what happens when, as
part of the audience, one views a character in a film:
Engagement is fed by the viewer’s own previous
experiences of pain and loss, which can influence the
‘like me’ framework—depending on the relationship
between viewer and character. Sometimes a character
will not invite the vicarious sharing of emotions. The
character’s actions or the situation they are in could be
too farfetched for the viewer to allow empathy; in the
latter case conscious simulation by the viewer might be
required in order to understand the character. (Grodal
and Kramer 2010, p. 27, citing; Smith 1995).
From the perspective of the actor, however, if a character does not invite the vicarious sharing of emotions, that
makes the work of empathy more difficult, but even more
important. In some circumstances it may be right to think
that the actor fails if they cannot empathically get inside the
character’s “farfetched” actions (but we’ll see below that this
is not universally accepted in acting theory).
One might also think that by means of this higher-order
empathic process of getting inside the character’s “head” or
getting familiar with his actions in various situations, one’s
more immediate feel for the character might be strengthened.
In this way, higher-order empathy does not remain purely
an intellectual understanding; it may be closer to an emotional understanding, as it is described by actors. One way
to understand this is that the higher-order work of empathy
(using narrative-imaginative practices) leads to a performance that elicits, in the actor, something closer to basic
empathy-in-performance, allowing the character to come
alive in the actor’s work.
Whether this feeling approaches an actor’s identity with
the character, or a strong form of attunement, is an issue that
may qualify what can be described as empathy. On the one
hand, most theorists of empathy maintain that empathy is
not equivalent to an identity with the other person; empathy
requires that the distinction between self and other is maintained (Decety 2005). Paul Ricoeur (1992, p. 193) calls this
a ‘nonsubstitutibility’ anchored in the use of the first-person
pronoun. On the other hand, one might think that when the
actor is finished with her research and is actually performing her role, she is bringing the character to life, and her
motor system is enacting the character in a way that goes
beyond empathy.9 She is no longer empathically observing
9

Let’s note that this is complicated further by the fact that in performance an actor is typically working with others—other actors and
the director, for example—and even if the actor is alone on theatrical

or simulating the actions of another; she is enacting them,
and the actor/character is saying ‘I’, so that the distinction
between self and other diminishes.
These are issues that are often discussed in acting theory.
Here we briefly discuss three different theories to see how
they approach questions about empathy. These are three out
of many methods of acting, although these are classic and
well-known theories—pillars on which others have built.
(1) One view, which derives from Denis Diderot (1883), is
that the actor must remain “cold” and avoid empathy
for her character. This was also the position of Bertolt Brecht. Brecht takes empathy to mean matching
emotional states, as one finds in simulation theory.
The actor must try to avoid empathically matching a
character’s emotional state by practicing an “alienation
effect,” which “intervenes, not in the form of absence
of emotion, but in the form of emotions which need not
correspond to those of the character portrayed” (Brecht
1975a, p. 94). The actor should avoid being infected
with the emotions portrayed; if emotions are to be portrayed, it is not by means of empathy (Brecht 1975b, p.
145).
	  John Metcalf describes a method that would guide
the actor to this end. The actor must maintain a double
consciousness—“one part of it being devoted to the
character portrayed, the other part maintaining a watchful and critical attitude on the part of the actor’s own
real self” (Metcalf 1931, p. 236). Imagination, according to Metcalf, makes this possible by allowing the
actor to remain somewhat distant from a real emotion,
which may be a form of protection for the actor. “If the
actor cannot vividly represent to himself in imagination
the mental attitude of the character he is to portray, it is
hopeless for him to try to represent it to other people.
Imagining a given mental state tends to stimulate the
motor responses appropriate to that state, and these,
once produced, are controlled, modified, selected, and

Footnote 9 (continued)
stage or in soliloquy, there is also an audience that responds to the
character. All of these others may generate their own intersubjective
responses that can modulate an actor’s performance and her empathy
for her character. As Grodal and Kramer (2010, p. 27), note: “The
director’s lack of craftsmanship might also fail to encourage empathetic resonance, despite their intentions.” An audience’s empathic
or non-empathic response may interfere much less with the actor’s
empathic resonance with her character if the actor is fully engaged
with her performance. We don’t try to answer this question here—
whether it is possible or not to ignore audience reaction. One might
argue that if an actor is swayed in empathic resonance by an audience’s reaction, then some form of evaluative judgment may be interfering with her performance, and with her empathy for the character
in general.
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developed through rehearsal in the interest of the art of
the theatre” (p. 236). Metcalf follows Titchener in distinguishing the imagined/virtual kinaesthetic response
from a real one, where the kinaesthetic image is limited
in terms of what motor processes are activated. “Real
emotions are out of place on the stage” (p. 237).
(2) In contrast, Konstantin Stanislavski advises the actor to
draw on her own experience. He thus builds a simulationist view that encourages empathy.
Once you have established this contact between
your life and your part, you will find that inner
push or stimulus. Add a whole series of contingencies based on your own experience in life, and
you will see how easy it will be for you sincerely
to believe in the possibility of what you are called
upon to do on the stage... The feelings aroused
will express themselves in the acts of this imaginary person had he been placed in the circumstances made by the play. (Stanislavski 1936, p.
41, 49)
	  The actor’s job, according to Stanislavski is to create
the inner life of the character and to express it in artistic
form. This is an embodied craft, allowing for controlled
responses of vocal and physical apparatus (Stanislavski
1936, pp. 15–17).10 According to Jean Benedetti (1998,
p. 2), Stanislavski requires the actor to draw on personal experience in portraying a character.
Since there is no ‘character’ out there somewhere,
only me on the stage in an imaginary situation, my
initial exploration of the play must be as myself,
as me. To turn fiction into fact for me, I have to ask
myself at every point in the play, ‘If this situation
were true, what would I do?’ (Benedetti 1998, p.
8).
	  The actor needs to draw on her own affective memory so that the fictional character can express real emotion—precisely the thing that Metcalf suggests has no
place on the stage. This is accomplished through a form
of empathy that seemingly involves both a simulation
based on the actor’s own experience, and a higher-order
use of narrative as the actor (and his company) explores
the play to gain “a sense of the play as a whole, and its
meaning”—its complete narrative context (Benedetti
1998, p. 6).
	  This approach is also consistent with an idea prevalent in Dilthey’s romantic hermeneutics, namely that
10
See Connolly and Ralley (2007) for an analysis of Stanislavski
from the perspective of embodied cognition, action-orientation, and
MNs. Also, Hatfield et al. (2011) for the importance of action/posture, etc. in Stanislavski’s method. Cook (2007, p. 592) provides
interesting examples of how acting can affect both body image and
body schema.
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we are able to empathically understand the other, even
someone historically or culturally removed from us,
because there is something like a universal human
nature that we can tap into. Dilthey follows Schleiermacher in appealing to empathy as a shared form of
access that is universally human. This was the basis
for Schleiermacher’s “divinatory” method of interpretation. “The divinatory is based on the assumption that
each person is not only a unique individual in his own
right, but that he has a receptivity to the uniqueness of
every other person” (Schleiermacher 1977, sect. 2.6).
On this view, unique or not, we are all capable of the
same or similar things. Empathy allows the actor to see
a character as if it were she (the actor) faced with the
different circumstances that characterize the character’s
life. An actor can accept the circumstances as her own
because they can and always will be a possibility for
her.
(3) Sanford Meisner’s approach can be conceived as a
move away from the simulationist view toward a more
enactivist or action-oriented method. Meisner recommends that the actor “gets out of [her] head,” i.e.,
shifts away from her own affective memory, or internal
thoughts about, or higher-order imaginative simulations
of the character, which have a “tendency to make actors
more introverted…. Introverted actors tend to retreat
into their thoughts, where they can’t react fully to what
goes on around them.” (Esper and DiMarco 2008, p.
215). The actor, to perform the character’s actions, to
become the character, should engage instinctively and
emotionally with the present environment and the other
actors.
	  Getting out of one’s head is an enactivist conception
that takes as a starting point the fact that we are dynamically in a world of affordances. In this regard, Lutterbie
(2011, p. 102) cites Evan Thompson’s enactivist view
of empathy: “This dialogical dynamic is not a linear or
additive combination of two preexisting, skull-bound
minds. It emerges from and reciprocally shapes the
nonlinear coupling of oneself to another in perception and action, emotion and imagination, gesture and
speech.” Although Lutterbie mentions imagination, the
emphasis here is on basic empathy. Acting, especially
acting face-to-face with other characters, draws on
one’s natural interactional processes and on the affordances provided by one’s surroundings. A performance
that follows such principles just is an empathic performance since, as Thompson suggests, such concrete
encounters “of self and other fundamentally involve
empathy, understood as a unique and irreducible kind
of intentionality” (Thompson 2001, p. 1). In this regard,
the enactivist account follows the phenomenological
conception of empathy as a “non-inferential bodily [and
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perceptually-based] pairing of self and other” (2001,
p, 9) which takes place, not in one’s head, but in the
performance, and in dyadic interactions with others.11
Just as we become who we are in our everyday situated interactions with others, in the acting performance
one becomes the character who is elicited by the other
characters and by the staged situation. According to this
interpretation of Meisner’s technique, empathy is not a
tool to be used by the actor; it is something enacted in
the acting performance, not unlike Ryle’s child who in
pretend playacts the bear.
We note that these different approaches to acting are prescriptive ones. They specify how, ideally, the actor ought to
act and how empathy fits that prescription. Our own interest,
in contrast, is descriptive. We are asking how empathy works
in the various possibilities that acting allows. In this respect
there may not be one clear-cut answer since those possibilities may vary depending on which technique or method the
actor uses.

4 A Twofold Conception
To give us a sense of how empathy works in the various possibilities that acting allows, we propose to adapt the notion
of “twofoldness” that Wollheim (1987) uses to characterize a double aspect of depiction in art. For Wollheim, our
experience of a work of art is twofold in that it has a double
intentionality:12 it is a co-consciousness (or what phenomenologists sometimes call an ‘apperception’) of what is represented and of the work of art as a thing involving or expressing a technique of representation. Wollheim thus emphasizes
a kind of double intentionality in which we know that we
are not face-to-face with the painted (represented) figure,
yet we encounter or see-in the painting the character portrayed. Importantly, he emphasizes, these are “two aspects
of a single experience that I have … two aspects [that are]
distinguishable but also inseparable… [T]hey are not two
experiences” (1987, p. 46).

11
In this regard there may be significant differences in empathic
performance between acting on stage with other actors and acting on
camera where it is often the case that an actor is not in face-to-face
contact with her interlocutor. In this case the director, but especially
the script and the actor’s N-imagination may be even more crucial
for empathic performance. In stage production practices of blocking
(which include the design of the performance space, the placing and
movement of objects or props, and especially the positioning of actors
for a particular scene helps to scaffold the actor’s performance; in
film, however, according to the film actor Richard Gere (in conversation), good writing (i.e., a good screenplay) can do something similar.
12
We take the term ‘double intentionality’ from Scruton (2009) who
makes a similar point in the context of music.

Smith (2011, 279 ff) uses Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness to characterize the relation between the audience and
the character/actor. In both of these analyses the phenomenon of twofoldness, the ability to “see-in” the physical
aspects of the artwork, or the craft of the actor, the object
depicted or the character portrayed, concerns the observer
or audience perspective on the work of art or the character.
To see how this may be applied in the context of acting,
consider Jean-Paul Sartre’s example of the French actress
Claire Franconay impersonating Maurice Chevalier (Sartre
2004, 25 ff). As a member of the audience watching Franconay, according to Sartre, one is always aware that one is
witnessing an impersonation; when one imagines Chevalier
with the help of Franconay, one is always aware that Chevalier is not literally present, but imagined. There is a kind of
double consciousness that on the one hand allows you to see
Chevalier, and on the other hand allows you to critically ask
whether Franconay is getting it “right.” In his analysis of this
consciousness Sartre indicates two important features: that
there is a knowledge (a prior knowledge of Chevalier and the
characteristic things that he would do on stage, as well as
the knowledge that Chevalier is not present), and an affective
aspect—(“All perception [i.e., of Franconay] is accompanied
by an affective reaction” [2004, p. 28])—a feeling of the
presence of Chevalier.
The notion of twofoldness has also been explained within
the framework of simulation theory. Part of the simulationist story as it applies to the observer/audience perspective
is that basic mirror system processes activated when we see
the character portrayed may also be activated in response to
noticing the actor’s portrayal, including details of her technique. This is an argument made by Joerg Fingerhut (2018),
drawing from both Smith (2011, 2017) and the theory of
Freedberg and Gallese (2007). Again, this is a theory drawn
from an analysis of what happens in viewing an artwork
(e.g., a painting or sculpture) and applied to what happens
when we are part of the theatrical audience. With respect to
the artwork, Freedberg and Gallese argue that various physical properties of artwork allow the observer to grasp the
artist’s style by activating the mirror neuron system (MNS),
which responds to the physical aspects in the artifact even if
no human figure is represented (Umiltà et al. 2012). Fingerhut summarizes more recent research.
In a recent series of studies, Heimann, Gallese, and
colleagues have applied MNS paradigms also to the
study of filmic means. They used different edits (continuity vs. noncontinuity editing) or different camera
and lens movements (zoom vs. dolly cam vs. steady
cam) to film the same scene. As they discovered, those
different configurational aspects of the presentation of
a scene engage the motor system [of an audience member] differentially (see Heimann et al. 2017, for cuts,

13

S. Gallagher, J. Gallagher

and, 2014, for camera). In each of their self-produced
scenes there is an actress/actor present, grasping or
passing an object. (Fingerhut 2018, p. 32).
On this simulationist view the MNS is seemingly affected
in a double way, attuned to both the character (or the action)
being portrayed and the editorial and filmic techniques that
shape the scene’s meaning. Details that pertain to context and are shaped by the camera and filmic techniques
are shown to affect subpersonal processes that inform our
perception. Such filmic techniques may be something we
become conscious of from a critical perspective, in the same
way that, as Sartre suggests, we may become conscious of
how well Franconay is doing Chevalier. Picking up on this
Sartrean point, since an actor is present and engaged in some
action in the experimental film, the viewer may be attuned
to the actor’s technique as well as to the action portrayed.
This kind of diplopia may involve shifting from one focus
to another, sometimes being absorbed in the character and
story line, and sometimes noticing the filmic or acting techniques. But as Wollheim suggests, this may also be one double experience.
We suggest that this same kind of twofoldness or double
attunement also applies, with some modification,13 from
the perspective of the actor who must, at certain points of
preparation, distinguish between the character portrayed and
her own portrayal effected in her craft. This double attunement is not the same thing as empathy but both basic and
higher-order empathy can help fine-tune this twofoldness
in the actor. Indeed, in her performance the basic empathic
experience that emerges is correlated to an integrated set
of subpersonal (motoric, kinaesthetic, affective) processes
since in the performance the character’s actions are in fact
generated by the actor’s own movements of which she is prereflectively aware. At the same time the actor’s higher-order
empathic understanding of the character needs to be folded
into this embodied-affective performance. Her higher-order
empathic understanding of the character operates as a guide
to her awareness of her own technique and about whether

13
There are important complications involved in applying this idea
to the actor rather than the audience. As one reviewer suggested, the
audience member empathizes with the portrayed character on stage
whereas the actor who performs the role is somehow on both sides of
the empathic relation, being both the empathizer and performing the
character with whom she is empathizing. That this kind of ambiguous
“reversible” relation is not only possible but familiar in everyday life
is made clear by phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty (2012) in his
description of our relation to our own body which is both the body
that experiences (lived body or Leib) and the body that we can experience as an object (Körper). This ambiguity, which allows for shifting our perspective on ourselves, is also related to the phenomenological explanation of empathy which, as noted above, involves the (ap)
perception (or co-perception) of the other person’s lived body grasped
through the experience of our own lived body.
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she is getting the character “right.” The double attunement
happens when this higher-order empathic attitude is embedded in and is codetermined by the basic empathic attitude,
so that both attitudes are present in a figure-ground relation.
This double attunement, which in some instances may
involve a shifting from background to foreground, from one
perspective to another is, for the actor, a shift from an inperformance awareness of the world and others through the
eyes of the character, to a self-awareness of performance.14
This is a kind of expert ability that involves maintaining and
at the same time manipulating what we characterized (in
Sect. 2) as integrated processes of basic and higher-order
empathy that are not always clearly distinguishable off stage,
in everyday life. This kind of dynamical shifting from background to foreground and vice versa may be more sustained
or frequent as the actor prepares her role. It becomes less
frequent, and closer to a fully integrated experience during
performance. Accomplishing this double attunement takes
rehearsal and work which are transformed into performance.
These processes constitute the actor’s expertise. From the
perspective of the actor, self (i.e., the actor) and other (the
character) are still distinguishable, but also inseparable in
the performance. It is the twofoldness of the experience
that prevents us from conceiving of the actor-character relation as one of identity, which would destroy the empathic
relation.
In everyday life, instances of empathy that may be initiated in our basic responses to others involving embodied
(motor, kinaesthetic, perceptual and affective) processes
can progress into higher-order concerns about understanding context (via N-imagination). In contrast, for the actor
who must study and prepare and rehearse her character, the
process may begin with higher-order processes that provide
a contextualized empathic understanding of the character
that eventually and to varying degrees, integrates with the
more basic empathic processes in her actual performance.
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This may involve an enhanced form of pre-reflective self-awareness similar to that described by dancers, musicians and athletes (see
Christensen et al. 2016; Gallagher 2018; Montero 2010; Salice et al.
2017).

Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor’s Empathy for her Character	
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativeco
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

References
Benedetti J (1998) Stanislavski and the actor. Methuen Drama,
London
Brecht B (1975a) A short organum for the theatre. In: Willett J (ed
& trans.), Brecht on theatre: the development of an aesthetic.
Methuen., London p 181, § 4
Brecht B (1975b) Alienation effects in chinese acting. In: Willett
J (ed & trans.), Brecht on theatre: the development of an aesthetic. Methuen, London
Christensen W, Sutton J, McIlwain DJ (2016) Cognition in skilled
action: meshed control and the varieties of skill experience.
Mind Lang 31(1):37–66
Connolly R, Ralley R (2007) The laws of normal organic life or
Stanislavski explained: towards a scientific account of the
subconscious in Stanislavski’s system. Stud Theatre Perform
27(3):237–259
Cook A (2007) Interplay: the method and potential of a cognitive
scientific approach to theatre. Theatre J 59(4):579–594
de Vignemont F (2012) What is it like to feel another’s pain? Philos
Sci 79(2):295–316
Decety J (2005) Une anatomie de l’empathie. Psychiatr Sci Humain
3(11):16–24
Diderot D (1883) The paradox of acting [Le paradoxe sur le comedien]
Trans W. H. Pollock. Chatto and Windus, London
Dilthey W (1976) Dilthey: selected writings. Trans. Rickman HP.
Cambridge University Press, London
Dilthey W (1992) Gesammelte Schriften. vol 7, Der Aufbau der
geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften. B. G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, Stuttgart
Dilthey W (2002) The formation of the historical world in the human
sciences. In: Makkreel R, Rodi F (eds) Selected works, vol 3.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp 101–174
Du Bos J-B (1748) Critical reflections on poetry, painting, and music,
vol 3. Trans. Nugent T, reprinted 1978. AMS Press, New York
Esper W, Dimarco D (2008) The actor’s art and craft: William Esper
teaches the meisner technique. Anchor Books, New York
Fingerhut J (2018) Embodied seeing-in, empathy, and expansionism. Projections 12(2):28–38. https: //doi.org/10.3167/
proj.2018.120205
Foster SL (2005) Choreographing empathy. Topoi 24(1):81–91
Freedberg D, Gallese V (2007) Motion, emotion and empathy in
esthetic experience. Trends Cognit Sci 11(5):197–203
Gallagher S (2007) Simulation trouble. Soc Neurosci 2(3–4):353–365
Gallagher S (2008) Neural simulation and social cognition. In: Pineda
JA (ed) Mirror neuron systems: the role of mirroring processes in
social cognition. Humana Press, Totowa, p 355–371
Gallagher S (2012) Empathy, simulation and narrative. Sci Context
25(3):301–327
Gallagher S (2017) Enactivist interventions: rethinking the mind.
Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gallagher S (2018) Mindfulness and mindlessness in performance.
Italian J Cognit Sci 5(1):5–18
Gallagher S, Allen M (2018) Active inference, enactivism and the
hermeneutics of social cognition. Synthese 195(6):2627–2648
Gallagher S, Hutto D (2008) Understanding others through primary
interaction and narrative practice. In: Zlatev J, Racine T, Sinha

C, Itkonen E (eds) The shared mind: perspectives on intersubjectivity. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 17–38
Gallagher S, Hutto D (2019) Narrative in embodied therapeutic practice: getting the story straight. In: Payne H, Tantia J, Koch S,
Fuchs T (eds) Embodied perspectives in psychotherapy. Routledge, London
Gallese V (2001) The “shared manifold” hypothesis: from mirror
neurons to empathy. J Conscious Stud 8:33–50
Gallese V (2008) Mirror neurons and the social nature of language:
the neural exploitation hypothesis. Soc Neurosci 3(3–4):317–333
Gazzola V, Keysers C (2008) The observation and execution of actions
share motor and somatosensory voxels in all tested subjects:
single-subject analyses of unsmoothed fMRI data. Cereb Cortex
19(6):1239–1255
Geiger M (1910) Über das Wesen und die Bedeutung der Einfühlung.
In: Schumann F (ed) IV. Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie
(29–73). Barth VJA Leipzig 2010/2011. Translated by Gödel F,
Aragonaas M (2015) On the essence and meaning of empathy
(Parts I & II). Dialog Philos Mental Neurosci 8(1):19–31 and
8(2):75–86
Goldman A (2005) Imitation, mind reading, and simulation. In: Hurley
S, Chater N (eds) Perspectives on imitation II. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 79–93
Goldman A (2006) Simulating minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Goldman A (2011) Two routes to empathy. In: Coplan A, Goldie P
(eds) Empathy: philosophical and psychological perspectives.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 31–44
Goldstein K, Scheerer M (1964) Abstract and concrete behavior: an
experimental study with special tests. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University. Reprint of Psychological Monographs 53(2):1941
Goldstein TR, Winner E (2010) A new lens on the development of
social cognition: the study of acting. In: Milbrath C, Lightfoot
C (eds) Art and human. Taylor & Francis Group, New York,
pp 221–247
Grodal T, Kramer M (2010) Empathy, film, and the brain. Recherches
sémiotiques/Semiotic Inquiry 30(1–2–3):19–35
Hatfield E, Rapson RL, Le YCL (2011) Emotional contagion and
empathy. In: Batson CD et al (eds) The social neuroscience of
empathy. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 19–30
Hauk O, Johnsrude I, Pulvermüller F (2004) Somatotopic representation of action words in human motor and premotor cortex. Neuron
41(2):301–307
Heimann K, Umiltà MA, Guerra M, Gallese V (2014) Moving mirrors: a high-density EEG study investigating the effect of camera
movements on motor cortex activation during action observation.
J Cognit Neurosci 26(9):2087–2101
Heimann K, Uithol S, Calbi M, Umiltà MA, Guerra M, Gallese V
(2017) ‘Cuts in action’: a high-density EEG study investigating
the neural correlates of different editing techniques in film. Cognit
Sci 41(6):1555–1588
Husserl E (1952) Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische
Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, Husserliana 4. Martinus
Nijhoff, Den Haag
Husserl E (1964) Cartesian meditations. Trans. D. Cairns. Kluwer
Academic, London
Husserl E (1973) Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität I. Husserliana 13. Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag
Husserl E (1980) Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung (Husserliana
XXIII). Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag
Hutto DD (2007) The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology. R Inst Philos Suppl 60:43–68
Jacob P (2011) The direct perception model of empathy: a critique. Rev
Philos Psychol 2(3):519–540
Kaltwasser L (2018) Sharing the filmic experience—the physiology of socio-emotional processes in the cinema. In: Conference

13

S. Gallagher, J. Gallagher
presentation: being moved. art, film, narrative, and the body-brain
(June 4–6 2018) Berlin
Kosslyn SM, Thompson WL (2003) When is early visual cortex activated during visual mental imagery? Psychol Bull 129(5):723
Lamy B (1699) La Rhétorique ou l’art de parler, 4th edn. n.p,
Amsterdam
Lipps T (1905) Die ethischen Grundfragen. Leopold Voss Verlag,
Hamburg
Lipps T (1906) Ästhetik. Verlag von L. Voss, Leipzig
Lipps T (1909) Leitfaden der Psychologie. Engelmann, Leipzig
Lutterbie J (2011) Toward a general theory of acting: cognitive science
and performance. Springer, Berlin
Merleau-Ponty M (2012) Phenomenology of perception, Trans Landes
D. Routledge, London
Metcalf JT (1931) Empathy and the actor’s emotion. J Soc Psychol
2(2):235–238
Montero B (2010) Does bodily awareness interfere with highly skilled
movement? Inquiry 53(2):105–122
Moran D (2017) Intercorporeality and intersubjectivity: a phenomenological exploration of embodiment. In: Durt C, Fuchs T, Tewes
C (eds) Embodiment, enaction and culture: investigating the constitution of the shared world. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 25–46
Nelson K (2003) Narrative and the emergence of a consciousness of
self. In: Fireman GD, McVay TEJ, Flanagan O (eds) Narrative
and consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 17–36
Price CJ, Devlin JT (2011) The interactive account of ventral
occipitotemporal contributions to reading. Trends Cognit Sci
15(6):246–253
Raz G, Winetraub Y, Jacob J, Kinreich S, Maron-Katz A, Shaham
G, Podlipsky I, Gilam G, Soreq E, Hendler T (2012) Portraying
emotions at their unfolding: a multilayered approach for probing
dynamics of neural networks. NeuroImage 60:1448–1461
Richner ES, Nicolopoulou A (2001) The narrative construction of differing conceptions of the person in the development of young
children’s social understanding. Early Edu Dev 12:393–432
Ricoeur P (1992) Oneself as another. Trans. K. Blamey. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago
Rucinska Z (2014) Basic pretending as sensorimotor engagement. Contemp Sensorimotor Theory 15:175–187
Ryle G (1949) The concept of mind. Hutchinson, London
Salice A, Høffding S, Gallagher S (2017) Putting plural self-awareness
into practice: the phenomenology of expert musicianship. Topoi.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9451-2
Sartre J-P (2004) The Imaginary, trans. J. Webber. Routledge, London
Schleiermacher F (1977) Hermeneutics: the handwritten manuscripts.
Trans. Duke J, Forstmann J. Scholars Press, Missoula [Original:
Compendium, 1819]

13

Scruton R (2009) Working towards art. Br J Aesthet 49(4):317–325
Shuler MG, Bear MF (2006) Reward timing in the primary visual cortex. Science 311(5767):1606–1609
Singer T, Seymour S, O’doherty JP, Stephan EK, Dolan RJ, Frith CD
(2006) Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived
fairness of others. Nature 439:466–469
Slovic P (2007) If I look at the mass I will never act: psychic numbing
and genocide. Judgm Decis Mak 2:79–95
Smith M (1995) Engaging characters: fiction, emotion, and the cinema.
Clarendon Press, Oxford
Smith M (2011) On the twofoldness of character. New Lit Hist
42(2):277–294
Smith M (2017) Film, art, and the third culture: a naturalized aesthetics
of film. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Stanislavski C (1936) An actor prepares. Trans. E. R. Hapgood. Theatre
Arts Inc., New York, reprinted 1989, Routledge, London
Stein E (2012) On the problem of empathy. Trans. W. Stein. Springer,
Dordrecht
Stueber KR (2006) Rediscovering empathy: agency, folk-psychology
and the human sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge
Stueber KR (2008) Reasons, generalizations, empathy, and narratives:
the epistemic structure of action explanation. History Theory
47:31–43
Tettamanti M, Buccino G, Saccuman MC, Gallese V, Danna M, Scifo P
et al (2005) Listening to action-related sentences activates frontoparietal motor circuits. J Cogn Neurosci 17:273–281
Thompson E (2001) Empathy and consciousness. J Consci Stud
8(5–6):1–32
Titchener EB (1909) Lectures on the experimental psychology of
thought-processes. Macmillan, New York
Umiltà MA, Berchio C, Sestito M, Freedberg D, Gallese V (2012)
Abstract art and cortical motor activation: an EEG study. Front
Hum Neurosci. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00311
Wollheim R (1987) Painting as an art. Thames and Hudson, London
Xu X, Zuo X, Wang X, Han S (2009) Do you feel my pain? Racial
group membership modulates empathic neural responses. J Neurosci 29(26):8525–8529
Zahavi D (2001) Beyond empathy: phenomenological approaches to
intersubjectivity. J Conscious Stud 8(5–7):151–167
Zahavi D (2012) Empathy and mirroring: Husserl and Gallese.
In: Breeur R, Melle U (eds) Life, subjectivity & art. Springer,
Dordrecht, pp 217–254
Zahavi D (2014) Self and other: exploring subjectivity, empathy, and
shame. Oxford University Press, Oxford

